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Abstract
Whether the sustainability of public debt is promoted or foiled by credit market
imperfections depends upon the ﬁscal policy rules. Under the golden rule, as credit
constraints dissipate, public debt is more likely sustainable, whereas under the balanced
budget rule, it is less likely sustainable. We also examine the social welfare under the
two diﬀerent ﬁscal rules. The balanced budget rule is more beneﬁcial to the super-near
future generations than the golden rule, whereas the golden rule is more beneﬁcial to
the near future generations than the balanced budget rule. However, to the far future
generations, the balanced budget rule once again becomes more beneﬁcial than the
golden rule.
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11 Introduction
Recently, the accumulation of public debt has become one of the most important policy and
political issues in most developed countries. The disturbances of national ﬁnance in Greece,
Spain, and Portugal, which surfaced in 2010, provoked debates about the sustainability of
public debt. Even other than Greece, Spain, and Portugal, many countries have built up
signiﬁcant amounts of public debt, often oriented to bigger governments (Neck and Sturm
(2008)). For instance, the public debt in Japan has almost reached 200% of its GDP in 2009.
Whether public debt that has substantially piled up is sustainable or not is one of the most
important questions in public ﬁnance. Many researchers including Chalk (2000), Rankin and
Roﬃa (2003) and Br¨ auninger (2005) have provided conditions under which public debt is
sustainable with speciﬁc ﬁscal rules in overlapping generations economies.
However, they do not take into consideration the direct relationship between economic
growth and ﬁscal sustainability. While Yakita (2008) and Arai (2008) incorporate the gov-
ernment investment in the ﬁnal production function so that they can study the relationship
among ﬁscal policies, ﬁscal sustainability, and economic growth, no studies, to the best of our
knowledge, focus on the relationship among ﬁscal sustainability, credit market imperfections,
and economic growth.1
Credit market imperfections are important in understanding macroeconomic phenomena.
For instance, the empirical literature on ﬁnance and growth has produced evidence for the
positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on economic growth (e.g., King and Levine (1993),
Levine, et al. (2000), and Aghion, et al. (2005)). The positive eﬀect has been demonstrated
theoretically in an extensive literature as well (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Galor
and Zeira (1993), Greenwood and Smith (1997), and Aghion, et al. (2005)).2 The contri-
1The vital importance of the initial amount of public debt for its sustainability was discovered in Chalk’s
(2000) pioneering work ﬁrst. By contrast, there is also an extensive literature in which the inter-temporal
budget constraint of a government, rather than the initial amount of public debt, is emphasized in order
to test the ﬁscal sustainability. See, for instance, Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trahan and Walsh (1988),
Hakkio and Rush (1991), Bohn(1998), and Chalk and Hemming(2000).
2Other than ﬁnance and growth, there is an extensive literature dealing with macroeconomic phenomena.
For business cycles and credit market imperfections, see for instance Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). For ﬁnancial
2bution of this paper is to ﬁll the gap between the literature on ﬁnance and growth and the
literature on ﬁscal sustainability.
Following the literature pioneered by Chalk (2000), by ﬁscal sustainability we mean that
the public-debt/GDP ratio does not diverge but converges to a certain ﬁnite level in the
long run under a given ﬁscal policy rule. This deﬁnition implies that if the GDP growth is
smaller than the public-debt growth, then the GDP cannot support public debt in the long
run. Of course, in this case, public debt is not sustainable.
We address the following questions: Does the dissipation of credit market imperfections
promote or foil the sustainability of public debt? Can an economy experience sustainable
economic growth under a sustainable ﬁscal policy? If the government alters ﬁscal policy
rules, how does the alternation aﬀect social welfare for each generation? In order to answer
these questions, we develop an overlapping generations model with public debt.
While the basic structure of our model is similar to those of Yakita (2008) and Arai(2008),
heterogeneity of agents in entrepreneurial talents within a generation is assumed in our
model. Agents are heterogeneous in creating capital goods, which are input for the ﬁnal
goods production. Due to the heterogeneity and credit constraints, less talented agents
become savers and more talented agents become entrepreneurs in equilibrium. In other
words, savers and entrepreneurs appear endogenously.
Credit market imperfections inﬂuence ﬁscal sustainability via two channels. On the one
hand, if the degree of credit market imperfections is relaxed, then more resources are used
by higher skilled entrepreneurs than when it is severe. Accordingly, the productivity in an
economy is promoted. On the other hand, if the degree of credit market imperfections is
relaxed and higher skilled entrepreneurs increase their borrowing, the demand for and supply
of ﬁnancial resources are changed by an increase in the interest rate.
An increase in the interest rate and productivity growth are very important for ﬁscal
sustainability because if an interest rate goes up, then it becomes a burden of the government
market globalization and credit market imperfections, see for instance Matsuyama (2007).
3and because if productivity is promoted and economic growth is boosted, then the public
debt/GDP ratio decreases, other things being equal. In other words, there are two conﬂicting
eﬀects of the dissipation of credit market imperfections on ﬁscal sustainability.
In order to investigate these two conﬂicting eﬀects, we examine two diﬀerent ﬁscal policy
rules. One is a so-called golden rule in which the government deﬁcit is used for public
investment which is beneﬁcial to the future generation. The other is a balanced budget rule
in which the primary balance is always zero. We will demonstrate that either one of the
conﬂicting eﬀects dominates the other under the two diﬀerent ﬁscal policy rules.
These ﬁscal policy rules are targeted in many countries and have been used in many
previous studies. The golden rule conforms to the budget rule of the Maastricht Treaty
convergence criteria. Meanwhile, the level of primary balance is targeted in some other
countries.3
While as mentioned, this paper ﬁlls the gap between the literature on ﬁnance and growth
and the literature on ﬁscal sustainability, it can be also allocated to the literature on ﬁnance
and inequality (e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993)). The diﬀer-
ence between the existing literature and our paper is that our model investigates the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial development on income inequality under various ﬁscal policies, whereas the exist-
ing literature on ﬁnance and inequality does not consider ﬁscal policies. In turn, while there
is an extensive literature on optimal ﬁscal policies in growth models (e.g., Chamley (1986),
Judd (1985), Barro (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), and Futagami, et al. (1993) among others),
few studies consider income distribution when they study social welfare.4 By contrast, we
investigate social welfare, counting income distribution.
To measure social welfare, we do not use the concept of Pareto optimality because it
does not pronounce income distribution. Since individuals in our model are heterogeneous
within a generation, per capita income is not an appropriate measure for social welfare,
3For example, the Japanese cabinet announced that they aim to archive primary surplus by around 2020
in the Fiscal Management Strategy 2010.
4An exception is Fiaschi (2002) who studies social welfare with income distribution and the ﬁscal policy
by developing an endogenous growth model.
4either. Instead, we use the social welfare function that Sen (1976) derives. Sen’s social
welfare function is suitable for capturing income distribution as well as per capita income.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Under the golden rule, as credit constraints become
less severe (more severe), public debt is more likely sustainable (unsustainable). Under the
balanced budget rule, as credit constraints become more severe (less severe), it is more likely
sustainable (unsustainable). These two completely opposite consequences are related to the
two conﬂicting eﬀects of credit market imperfections mentioned above. Under the golden
rule, since public deﬁcit is strictly associated with the proportion of the total output, the
law of motion of public debt is not subject to the market interest rate. This implies that
an eﬃciency-correcting eﬀect of the dissipation of credit market imperfections is dominant.
Then, with less severe (more severe) credit constraints, public debt is more likely to be
sustainable (unsustainable). Meanwhile, under the balanced budget rule, an interest-rate
eﬀect is dominant, implying that the law of motion of public debt is aﬀected by the market
interest rate and it becomes a burden of the government.
Under both of the ﬁscal rules, even though the government debt is on a sustainable
path, we obtain various growth patterns of per capita output depending upon the degree of
credit market imperfections. For instance, when the degree of credit market imperfections
is severe, an economy falls in a poverty trap. While this consequence is not surprising in
the existing literature on ﬁnance and growth (e.g., King and Levine (1993) and Aghion, et
al. (2005)), the novelty is that we clarify how growth patterns are aﬀected by the degree of
credit constraints and population growth under the two diﬀerent ﬁscal policy rules.
The consequence on social welfare is as follows. The balanced budget rule is more ben-
eﬁcial to the super-near future generations than the golden rule, whereas the golden rule is
more beneﬁcial to the near future generations than the balanced budget rule. However, to
the far future generations, the balanced budget rule once again becomes more beneﬁcial than
the golden rule. This alternation of dominant ﬁscal policy rules is caused by the diﬀerences
in a tax burden eﬀect and a crowding-out eﬀect of each ﬁscal rule in each period.
5This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we model an overlapping generations
economy where individuals within a generation are heterogeneous in entrepreneurial talents.
Each of them faces a credit constraint when they make a decision on investment. In section
3, we investigate the sustainability of public debt under the two diﬀerent ﬁscal policy rules,
by deriving the equilibrium dynamics for public debt and section 4 provides analyses on
growth patterns when public debt is sustainable. In section 5, we study social welfare, where
we take into account not only per capita consumption but also income distribution at each
point in time in measuring it. We make concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Model
2.1 Individuals
An economy consists of overlapping generations, i.e., young and old agents. Time is discrete
and expands from 0 to ∞. Each individual lives for two periods and exclusively obtains the
utility from his second-period consumption ct+1. Since he is risk-neutral, the utility function
is given by u(ct+1) := ct+1. The population of young agents at time is Lt, which grows at a
constant rate n, namely Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt.
In the ﬁrst period, each individual decides on how much he invests, borrows, and/or
deposits. The budget constraints in the ﬁrst and second periods are respectively given by:
kt + dt ≤ wt (1)
and
ct+1(1 + ˜ τt+1) ≤ qt+1ϕkt + Rt+1dt, (2)
where kt is an investment in a project and dt is a deposit when positive and a debt when
negative. As seen in Eq.(2), if an agent starts an investment project in the ﬁrst period, then
he can create capital goods ϕkt in the second period, which are sold to the ﬁnal production
sector with the price qt+1. Rt+1 is the gross (real) interest rate at time t + 1 and ˜ τt+1 is the
6rate of consumption tax. If we let 1 + ˜ τt+1 := 1
1−τt+1 where 0 ≤ τt+1 < 1, then Eq.(2) is
rewritten as:
ct+1 ≤ (qt+1ϕkt + Rt+1dt)(1 − τt+1). (3)
We assume that there is an inﬁnitely-lived representative ﬁnancial intermediary. Follow-
ing Aghion, et al. (2005), a credit constraint that the representative ﬁnancial intermediary
imposes on each individual is given by:
dt ≥ −νwt, (4)
where ν ∈ [0,∞) is the measure of the degree of credit constraints. We note that individuals
can borrow ﬁnancial resources up to ν times their wealth, which is wages earned when they
are young. In other words, we can regard wt as down-payment for the investment. In
appendix, the microfoundation for Eq.(4) is provided.5 The non-negativity constraint for
the investment is given by:
kt ≥ 0. (5)
The heterogeneity of individuals in productivity of capital creation is introduced. More
concretely, the productivity ϕ varies between individuals and is distributed uniformly over
[0,a] (a > 0). In other words, the distribution function of ϕ in [0,a] is given by G(ϕ) :=
ϕ
a.
Each individual knows his own productivity at his birth, while other individuals or even the
ﬁnancial intermediary does not know his productivity.6
Each individual maximizes ct+1 subject to inequalities (1), (3)-(5). The maximization




5This type of assumption for credit market imperfections is often imposed in the literature (e.g., Aghion,
et al. (1999), Aghion and Barnergee (2005), and Aghion, et al. (2005)). The credit constraint expressed
by inequality (4) can be replaced by the one associated with investment. In particular, even if we replace
inequality (4) with bt ≥ −kt where  ∈ [0;1), this alternative credit constraint is equivalent to inequality
(4) and thus the same results will be obtained.
6As discussed in Microfoundation I in appendix, only when an individual chooses not to repay his obli-
gations, the ﬁnancial intermediary monitors the individual. This assumption is along the same line as the
costly state veriﬁcation approach (e.g., Townsend (1979)). In this paper, we abstract from our model a case
in which oﬃcials in the ﬁnancial intermediary monitor individuals’ talents. Instead, they check individuals’





wt ≤ dt ≤ wt,
where µ := ν
1+ν. When rt+1−ϕqt+1 > 0, it is optimal for an individual to choose dt = wt and
kt = 0, whereas when rt+1 −ϕqt+1 < 0, then it is optimal to choose dt = −
µwt
1−µ and kt = wt
1−µ.
Formally, we obtain:
Lemma 1 Let ϕt :=
Rt+1
qt+1 . The following hold.
• If ϕt > ϕ, then kt = 0 and dt = wt.
• If ϕt < ϕ, then kt = wt




The ﬁnancial sector is competitive and thus the representative ﬁnancial intermediary cannot
acquire proﬁts from its business.7
In addition to imposing credit constraints, the ﬁnancial intermediary accepts deposits
from individuals and loans resources to them. The ﬁnancial intermediary buys government
bonds with an excess of saving. Let Bt+1 be government bonds issued at time t and redeemed
at time t + 1. The balance sheet of the ﬁnancial intermediary is given by:
Ft + Bt+1 = Dt,
where Ft and Dt are respectively the aggregate loan and deposit. We assume that B1 is
greater than zero, namely, at time zero the public debt piles up. In order to ﬁnance the
public debt, the government has to issue the government bonds. In other words, B1 is a
predetermined variable.8
7This type of ﬁnancial intermediary is often assumed in the literature. See for instance Grandmont (1983)
and Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006).
8Implicitly, we assume that all the transactions including the government sector and the private sector
are done in real terms, implying that there are no nominal contracts nor nominal money. Therefore, B1
cannot jump at time zero.
82.3 Production Sector
A representative ﬁrm produces ﬁnal goods from capital goods and labor. We assume a





where Yt is the output, Lt is the aggregate young labor, and Zt is the aggregate capital goods.
Following Baro (1990), we incorporate per capita capital stock of the government gt into the
production function. From a view point of the private agents, gt is exogenously given. We
assume that both private and public capital goods depreciate entirely in one period.
The production sector is perfectly competitive so that the production factors are paid
their marginal products:
qt = αYt/Zt
wt = (1 − α)Yt/Lt,
where qt is the price of the capital goods and wt is the wage rate at time t.
2.4 Government
The budget constraint of the government at time t + 1 is given by:
Bt+2 + Tt+1 = Rt+1Bt+1 + I
g
t+1, (6)
where Tt+1 is a tax collected at time t + 1 and I
g
t+1 is the investment executed by the
government.















9We will compare the outcomes of two diﬀerent ﬁscal policy rules. The ﬁrst one is a so-
called golden rule, where the government can borrow only to invest in public capital goods.
It holds that Bt+2 − Bt+1 = λI
g
t+1, where λ ∈ [0,1). In addition, the government invests a
certain proportion of output of a corresponding year in public capital goods, i.e., it holds
that I
g
t+1 = θYt+1 where θ ∈ (0,1). Thus, it follows that Bt+2 − Bt+1 = λI
g
t+1 = λθYt+1. We
call this ﬁscal rule the “golden rule,” following the literature on public ﬁnance. While this
ﬁscal rule seems ad hoc, in reality by the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Union,
the member countries must respect that public debt should be less than 60% of the GDP.9
The second one is a balanced-budget ﬁscal policy where the primary balance is equal to
zero, namely, Tt+1 −I
g
t+1 = 0.10 In addition to this ﬁscal policy rule, the government invests
a certain proportion of output in public capital goods: I
g
t+1 = θYt+1 as in the golden rule
case. We call this ﬁscal policy the “balanced budget rule.”
Under both of the ﬁscal policy rules, we assume that θ ≤ α so as for the tax rate τt+1 to




t+1 = gt+1Lt+1 = θYt+1, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the production sector becomes:
qt = αA
1/αθ
(1−α)/α := ¯ q (8)
wt = (1 − α)A
1/αθ
(1−α)/αzt, (9)
where zt := Zt
Lt.









(1 − α)¯ qF(ϕt)
α(1 − µ)(1 + n)
zt, (10)
9Yakita (2008) investigates the sustainability of public debt with this type of ﬁscal policy setting in an
overlapping generations economy with a perfect credit market.
10Alternatively, we could assume that the primary balance is not equal to zero such that Tt+1 − I
g
t+1 =
Yt+1. See our companion paper, Arai(2008) and Kunieda (2010) for the investigation into this ﬁscal policy.
10where F(ϕt) =
∫ a




The total loan at time t is given by Ft =
µwtLt
1−µ (1−G(ϕt)) and the total deposit is given by






As mentioned, at time zero public debt piles up and thus B1 is predetermined. Since the
government debt is ﬁnanced by excess saving in the private sector, ϕ0 is subject to the initial
government debt so that the government bond market clears. We should note that even
though qt+1 and Rt+1 are forward-looking variables, their expectations are not independently
established. Accordingly, ϕ0 is a predetermined variable as well.
3 Sustainability
In the literature, public debt is said to be sustainable if the public-debt/GDP ratio converges
to a certain ﬁnite level in the long run. We follow this deﬁnition for ﬁscal sustainability in
discussing the sustainability of public debt in what follows.
3.1 Under the golden rule
Under the golden rule, it follows that Bt+2 −Bt+1 = λθYt+1. The government imposes taxes
on private agents so that the government budget constraint (6) holds. The tax rate τt+1
is computed from the ﬁscal policy rule, and from Eqs.(6)-(11) we obtain a tax rate τt+1 as
follows:
τt+1 =
ϕt(G(ϕt) − µ) + θF(ϕt)/α − (1 − α)(G(ϕt+1) − µ)F(ϕt)/(α(1 − µ))
F(ϕt) + ϕt(G(ϕt) − µ)
.
We note that under the assumption θ ≤ α, τt+1 is always no greater than one.














11Since B1 ≥ 0, we have G(ϕ0) − µ ≥ 0. By applying a mathematical induction to Eq.(12),
we note that for all t ≥ 0, G(ϕt)−µ ≥ 0. Accordingly, we only investigate the case in which
ϕt ≥ aµ and thus Bt+1 ≥ 0 for the dynamical system (12).







1−µ , we rewrite Eq.(12) for t ≥ 1 as:
˜ Bt+1 =
α(1 − µ)















1 + µ + (1 − µ)
~ Bt
1−α
) + λθ := Ψx( ˜ Bt;λ,µ,θ), (13)
where we should note that ˜ Bt ∈ [0,1 − α), i.e., Bt should be supported by the savings of
young agents at time t.
Lemma 2 Ψx( ˜ Bt;A,λ,µ,θ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex with respect to ˜ Bt.





. It suﬃces to demonstrate
that ˜ Ψ( ˜ Bt) is strictly increasing and convex with respect to ˜ Bt.
∂ ~ 	( ~ Bt)
∂ ~ Bt > 0 is obvious
because F(.) is decreasing with respect ˜ Bt. By taking a derivative of ˜ Ψ( ˜ Bt), we obtain
∂ ~ 	( ~ Bt)







(F(.))2 . From the last,
∂ ~ 	( ~ Bt)
∂ ~ Bt is increasing with respect to ˜ Bt and
thus ˜ Ψ( ˜ Bt) is strictly convex again because F(.) is decreasing with respect ˜ Bt. 
The most important parameters for the sustainability of public debt under the golden rule
are λ and µ, which are associated with the government policy and the degree of credit market
imperfections, respectively. The zero deﬁcit case in which λ = 0 is a suitable benchmark to
discuss the sustainability of public debt. Therefore, we start our study with this case.
Lemma 3 Suppose that λ = 0. Then, the following hold:
• If 1 + µ ≤ 2α
a(1−α) q, then there is no non-trivial steady state for the dynamical system
(13).
• If 1 + µ > 2α
a(1−α) q, then there is a non-trivial steady state for the dynamical system
(13).
12Proof: Since Ψx( ˜ Bt) is strictly increasing and convex and Ψx(0) = 0, it follows that if
Ψ′
x(0) ≥ 1, then there is no non-trivial steady state, whereas if Ψ′
x(0) < 1, then there is a non-






(<)1 is rewritten as F(aµ) ≤ (>)
α(1−µ)
(1−α) q ⇐⇒ 1 + µ ≤ (>) 2α
a(1−α) q. 
When the average productivity of agents is small or when the public investments are few
(i.e., a or θ is small), the ﬁrst case in proposition 1 is more likely obtained. In this case, the
public debt is unsustainable if ˜ B1 is greater than zero. Even though the economy exhibits
endogenous growth initially, the government debt crowds out the private investments and
the number of investors decreases. Consequently, the growth rates are reduced as time goes
by and then the total saving cannot support the built-up public debt.
Henceforth, we focus on the second case of lemma 3, i.e., the case in which there exists
a non-trivial steady state if the government conducts the zero-deﬁcit ﬁscal policy. Figure 1
provides a phase diagram for this case. Let Bx denote the non-trivial steady state of the
dynamical system. We note that if ˜ B1 is greater than Bx, the public debt is not sustainable.
[Figure 1 around here.]
While this result is not surprising in the existing literature, our interest is in what would





1−µ is increasing with respect to µ, Ψx(.) is decreasing with respect
to µ. Then, it follows from lemma 2 that the non-trivial steady state is increasing with µ.
This means that as credit market imperfections become less severe, the sustainable public
debt is more likely achievable in the golden rule. This happens because as credit market
imperfections are resolved, resource allocation is corrected and then productivity of the whole
economy is improved. As a consequence, the rate of economic growth goes up, which implies
that the economy can support more public debt than when credit market imperfections are
severe. Meanwhile, under the golden rule, the dynamical system (13) is independent of the
interest rate. Therefore, the burden of the government does not increase even though the
13interest rate goes up.
Next, we will see the positive deﬁcit case, which is a simple extension of the zero deﬁcit
case. As seen in Figure 2, if λ gradually goes up from zero to one with other things being
equal, another non-trivial steady state appears because the increase in λ shifts up the dy-
namical system (13). We call the high steady state BH, which was actually Bx when λ = 0,
and the low steady state BL, which was the trivial steady state. From the dynamical system
(13), the locus for ∆ ˜ B := ˜ Bt+1 − ˜ Bt = 0 (henceforth, we call this the ∆ ˜ B = 0 locus) is
given by ˜ Bt = BL and ˜ Bt = BH. From Figure 2, we note that if ˜ Bt < BL or ˜ Bt > BH, then
∆ ˜ B > 0, which implies that { ˜ Bt} is increasing. If BL < ˜ Bt < BH, then ∆ ˜ B < 0 and thus
{ ˜ Bt} is decreasing. If the public debt is sustainable, { ˜ Bt} eventually converges to BL.
[Figure 2 around here.]
Since Ψx( ˜ Bt) is convex and increasing with respect to ˜ Bt, if λ increases, then BH de-
creases. This implies that as the government deﬁcit goes up, the region where the initial
public debt provides the feasible path of the future public debt narrows. In particular, both
λ and θ are close to one, the public debt is unsustainable no matter what initial value it
takes because ˜ Bt should be less than one.
Again, these consequences are not surprising in the existing literature (e.g., Yakita (2008)
and Arai (2008)). However, there is novelty in that as µ goes up, Ψx( ˜ Bt) shifts down and the
public debt becomes more likely sustainable as in the case in which the government conducts
the zero-deﬁcit ﬁscal policy. Proposition 1 below provides a summary of this section.
Proposition 1 Suppose the government follows the golden rule. Then, as credit market
imperfections become less severe, public debt becomes more likely sustainable and the rate of
growth of public debt goes down.
143.2 Under the balanced budget rule




α + ˜ Bt+1
.
Again, we can verify that under the assumption θ ≤ α, τt is always no greater than one
because ˜ Bt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 1.
Under the balanced budget rule, the dynamical system for { ˜ Bt} for t ≥ 1 is given by



























1 + µ + (1 − µ)
~ Bt
1−α
) := Ψp( ˜ Bt;µ). (14)






is strictly increasing and strictly convex with respect to ˜ Bt
from the proof of lemma 2 and µ + (1 − µ)
~ Bt
1−α is increasing and convex with respect to ˜ Bt,
the claim is proven. 
lemma 5 below provides us with the information about a phase diagram for the dynamical
system (14).
Lemma 5 The following hold:
• If 1+ 1
µ ≤ 2α
1−α, then there is no non-trivial steady state for the dynamical system (14).
• If 1 + 1
µ > 2α
1−α, then there is a non-trivial steady state for the dynamical system (14).
Proof: Since Ψp( ˜ Bt) is strictly increasing and convex and Ψp(0) = 0, it follows that if
Ψ′
p(0) ≥ 1, then there is no non-trivial steady state, whereas if Ψ′
p(0) < 1, then there is a






is rewritten as F(aµ) ≤ (>)
aαµ(1−µ)
1−α ⇐⇒ 1 + 1
µ ≤ (>) 2α
1−α. 
15In lemma 5, the greater is µ, the more likely we have the ﬁrst case. However, if α is
around one third, as assumed in the literature, the ﬁrst case is implausible. We obtain a
phase diagram for the second case of lemma 5 in Figure 3. The non-trivial steady state is
denoted by Bp. As in the case of the golden rule, only when ˜ B1 ∈ [0,Bp], the public debt is
sustainable.
[Figure 3 around here.]
It is easily shown that ∂Ψp( ˜ Bt)/∂µ > 0 with ˜ Bt given. This implies that as a credit
constraint is relaxed, public debt is less likely sustainable. This is because, contrasting with
the golden rule, the balanced budget rule is subject to the interest rate. As credit market
imperfections are resolved, the interest rate goes up with other things being equal because
ﬁnancial resources are intensively used by capable agents. The higher interest rate becomes
a burden of the government. As in the previous section, a summary is given in proposition
2 below.
Proposition 2 Suppose the government follows the balanced budget rule in the sense that
Tt+1 − I
g
t+1 = 0 for all t ≥ 0. Then, as credit market imperfections become more severe,
public debt becomes more likely sustainable and the rate of growth of public debt goes down.
3.3 Discussion
We have clariﬁed how credit market imperfections aﬀect the sustainability of public debt,
depending upon the ﬁscal rules. This discovery has an important policy implication.
The parameter µ is thought of as a measure of the degree of ﬁnancial development.
Now suppose that the government is concerned about the sustainability of the public debt.
As demonstrated in our model, if an economy has a poorly developed ﬁnancial sector, the
government should conduct the balanced budget rule because the smaller is µ, the more
likely is the public debt sustainable. On the other hand, if an economy has a fully developed
ﬁnancial sector, the government should execute the golden rule because as µ becomes big,
16the public debt is more likely sustainable.
Probably, the governments in the real world more or less follow an intermediate case
between the golden rule and the balanced budget rule such as a convex combination of them
unless a ﬁscal regulation is imposed as in the EU countries. The policy implication of the
current model tells us in which direction a government should shift its ﬁscal policy depending
upon the country’s ﬁnancial development so that it can attain the sustainable public debt.
4 Economic Growth
In this section, we investigate economic growth in terms of per capita output when public
debt is sustainable. Our study is focused on the balanced growth paths in which the growth
rates of per capita output and capital goods are the same and constant. In both cases of the
golden rule and the balanced budget rule, as the parameter of credit market imperfections µ
goes up, the growth rate of an economy goes up. While this consequence is not surprising in
the existing literature (e.g., King and Levine (1993) and Aghion, et al. (2005)), the novelty
is that we clarify a relationship between credit market imperfections and economic growth
when an economy incurs public debt.
4.1 Under the golden rule
From wt = (1 − α)Yt/Lt and Eq.(10), we obtain:
yt =
(1 − α)¯ qF(ϕt−1)
α(1 − µ)(1 + n)
yt−1, (15)
where yt := Yt/Lt. The dynamical system of this economy for t ≥ 1 consists of Eqs.(15) and
Eq.(13) that is inserted again below:
˜ Bt+1 =
α(1 − µ)




where ϕt−1 = a((1 − µ)
~ Bt
(1−α) + µ).
In the balanced growth path, it follows that ˜ Bt = BL. To make the dynamical system
simple and to clarify the eﬀects of the degree of credit constraints and population growth,
17we let ˜ yt := ( ˜ Bt+1 − λθ)yt. Then, the dynamical system consisting of Eqs.(15) and (16) is







˜ Bt − λθ
)
. (17)
Since Eqs.(16) and (17) are respectively independent of population growth and the degree
of credit constraints, we can easily investigate the eﬀects of them. We note that since { ˜ Bt}
is bounded and BL > λθ, if {˜ yt} grows unboundedly, then the economy exhibits endogenous
growth, whereas if {˜ yt} converges to zero, then the economy shrinks and per capita output
converge to zero.
We denote the growth rate of per capita output in the balanced growth path as γy :=
~ yt
~ yt 1.
From Eq.(17), γy is given by 1
1+n(
BL
BL−λθ). Henceforth, we assume n ≥ 0.11 Then, we note
that if γy > 1 ⇐⇒ BL < ( 1
n + 1)λθ := Bz, then the economy exhibits endogenous growth
and if γy < 1 ⇐⇒ BL > Bz, then the economy shrinks as time goes by and falls in a poverty
trap.
Since BL is independent of population growth, if the rate of population growth is zero,
then the economy endogenously grows without fail. This is because if the rate of popula-
tion growth is equal to zero, the condition for the sustainability of public debt guarantees
large productivity enough for the economy to exhibit endogenous growth. By contrast, if
population growth is so big that BL > Bz, it falls in a poverty trap. Meanwhile, we note
that if the government conducts a zero deﬁcit ﬁscal policy, namely, λ = 0, then the economy
experiences endogenous growth because 0 = BL < Bz always holds.
While BL is not aﬀected by population growth, it is subject to the degree of credit
market imperfections. From the discussion in section 2, it is easily noted that ∂BL/∂µ < 0.
Since limn→0 Bz = ∞ and limn→∞ Bz = λθ, the patterns of economic growth depend upon
the degree of credit market imperfections, i.e., µ under a relatively large rate of population
growth.
11When −1 < n < 0, the economy always attains endogenous growth.
18To see this, the transition paths to the balanced growth paths of the two countries, whose
degrees of credit constraints are diﬀerent, are illustrated in Figure 4. Let us suppose that
there are two countries, country 1 and country 2 and that country i with µ = µi has Bi
L. We
assume that the parameters other than µ are the same between the two countries. However,
due to the diﬀerence in the degree of credit constraints, it follows that B1
L ∈ (Bz − ϵ,Bz),
and B2
L ∈ (Bz,Bz + ϵ) where ϵ is very small. In this case, we have µ2 < µ1. The diﬀerence
between µ1 and µ2 is very small or even inﬁnitesimal. Although the fundamentals of the two
economies are almost the same and they start with the same amount of per capita capital,
the fates of the two countries are completely diﬀerent.
At ﬁrst, both of them follow very similar transition paths as seen in Figure 4. Policymak-
ers in each country must be happy because public debt is small and they seemingly experience
economic growth. However, when country 2 reaches Bz, the economy starts shrinking. While
the policymaker in country 2 sees endogenous growth of country 1, they probably do not
understand what is going on in their own country. This example demonstrates that due to
an inﬁnitesimal diﬀerence in the degrees of credit constraints, the fates of countries are quite
diﬀerent.
[Figure 4 around here.]
4.2 Under the balanced budget rule
Since the characteristics of the balanced growth path under the balanced budget rule are
simple relative to the case of the golden rule, we provide a brief sketch of them. In the
balanced gowth path, it holds that ˜ Bt = 0 and thus γz =
a(1−α) q(1+µ)
2α(1+n) .
In contrast with the case of the golden rule, even though population growth is zero, the
economy might not be able to exhibit endogenous growth if the productivity parameters a
and A or the degree of credit market imperfections µ is so small that
a(1−α) q(1+µ)
2α < 1. This is
because the condition for the sustainability of public debt is independent of the productivity
19parameters a and A. In other words, the sustainable condition for public debt does not
require for the productivity parameters to be high.
This result implies that under the balanced budget, while as in the case of the golden
rule, an inﬁnitesimal diﬀerence in the degree of credit constraint can give quite diﬀerent
economic growth patterns, growth-enhancing factors, such as ﬁnancial sector development,
do not necessarily lead to sustainable public debt.
5 Social Welfare
5.1 Gini coeﬃcient and Sen’s social welfare function
In this section, we investigate social welfare when an economy incurs public debt and faces
credit market imperfections. In our model, since individuals are heterogeneous, it is not
enough to measure social welfare simply by aggregating consumption in the second period.
Then, we take into account income distribution between agents.
On the basis of our consideration, Sen’s (1976) social welfare function is used, which is
given by:
SWt := ¯ ct(1 − Gt) (18)
from t = 1 onwards, where ¯ ct is per capita disposable income and Gt is a Gini coeﬃcient
at time t. For simplicity, we assume that population is normalized to one, implying that
there is no population growth (n = 0), and ϕ has a uniform distribution in [0,1] (a = 1)
henceforth.12
From a national income identity, we have per capita income (or equivalently per capita
consumption) ¯ ct as follows:
¯ ct = Yt − Kt − I
g
t , (19)
where Kt is the aggregate investment at time t. Since we have Kt =
(1−α)Yt(1−G(ϕt))
1−µ and
12Even though we assume n ̸= 0 and a ̸= 1, the results obtained below will not change.
20I
g
t = θYt, Eq.(19) is rewritten as:
¯ ct = (α − θ + ˜ Bt+1)Yt. (20)
It is surprising that given Yt, if ˜ Bt+1 increases, then ¯ ct goes up. This happens because of a
general equilibrium eﬀect of a ﬁscal policy, namely, if ˜ Bt+1 goes up, the tax rate goes down
because I
g
t is determined by a ﬁscal policy rule. Eq.(20) means that since we employ an
overlapping generations model, Ricardian equivalence does not hold. There is a possibility
that an increase in public debt raises social welfare in an economy.13
We have derived ¯ ct from a macroeconomic perspective. In turn, in order to obtain the
Lorenz curve, we will compute ¯ ct from a microeconomic perspective. Consumption is given
by ct = ϕt−1¯ qwt−1(1 − τt) for individuals with ϕ < ϕt−1 and ct =
ϕ−µϕt 1
1−µ ¯ qwt−1(1 − τt) for
individuals with ϕ > ϕt−1, respectively. Therefore, we obtain:
¯ ct















t−1 − 2µϕt−1 + 1). (21)
















t 1−2µϕt 1+1 if ϕt−1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
(22)
Since the Gini coeﬃcient is formulated by Gt = 1 − 2
∫ 1
0 L(x;t)dx, we have:
1 − Gt = −
2(ϕ3
t−1 − 3ϕ2
t−1 + 3µϕt−1 − 1)
3(ϕ2
t−1 − 2µϕt−1 + 1)
. (23)






t−1 + 3µϕt−1 − 1)
3(ϕ2
t−1 − 2µϕt−1 + 1)
]
+ log[(α − θ + ˜ Bt+1)] + log[Yt], (24)
where ϕt−1 = (1−µ)
~ Bt
1−α+µ. Sen’s social welfare consists of the three parts. The ﬁrst term of
the right-hand side is an eﬀect of equity and the second term is an eﬀect of allocation within
13At a glance, this phenomenon seems related to dynamic eﬃciency. In fact, it is not related to it because
an increase in ¯ ct associated with ˜ Bt+1 is an issue of resource allocation within a period.
21a period. The third term comes from per capita output. Since the ﬁrst and second terms
converge to the steady-state values, the social welfare is dominated by per capita output
in the long run and thus an economy with the higher rate of growth can eventually attain
the higher social welfare. However, on the transitional path, the ﬁrst and second terms are
important, implying that some generations may gain the higher welfare, whereas the other
generations incur the lower welfare under a speciﬁc ﬁscal rule.
This discussion is politically very important because the government in power in a period
tends to increase the social welfare of the current generation at the sacriﬁce of the social
welfare of the future generations who are not born yet. Therefore, it is signiﬁcant to do
numerical experiments of the evolution of social welfare.
5.2 Numerical analysis
In order to compute the social welfare, we have to pin down ﬁve parameters: α, A, λ,
θ, and µ. Following the macroeconomics literature, let α take one third, α = 1/3. θ is
the government expenditure share of the gross domestic product. From the International
Financial Statistics created by the International Monetary Fund, we compute the average
of the government expenditure share in the United States from 2000 to 2007 and obtain
θ = 0.154. We can also observe the total central government debt of the United States in the
OECD database. We regard an increase in it as the budget deﬁcit, Bt+1 − Bt, and compute
λ = 0.086, which is the average value from 2000 to 2007.14 As with µ, we note from lemma
1 that µ is the ratio of the newly issued aggregate private credit to the investments. By
using the database for ﬁnancial structure created by Levine, et al. (2000) and updated by
themselves in 2010, we compute µ = 0.636, which is the average value from 2001 to 2005.
The parameter A is determined so that for any value µ ∈ [0,1) and θ = 0.154, the second
case of lemma 3 may hold and we set A = 6. While this value is ad hoc, A is eventually
cancelled out when we compare the two ﬁscal policy rules. Then, a parameter set is given
14Of course, if we include the budget deﬁcits of the local governments in our computation, then  should
be greater than 0:086.
22as follows:
(α,A,µ,λ,θ) = (1/3,6,0.636,0.086,0.154).
From Eqs.(9) and (10), the law of motion of output for t ≥ 1 is given by:
Yt =























1 + µ + (1 − µ)
~ Bt
1−α
) + λθ, (26)























˜ Bt + µ. (28)
The social welfare is computed recursively by using Eqs.(24), (25), (26) (under the golden
rule), and (28) or Eqs.(24), (25), (27) (under the balanced budget rule), and (28).
We set the initial level of public debt and output as in table 1.
Case 1 B1(initial public debt) = 1 Y0(initial output) = 3
Case 2 B1(initial public debt) = 1 Y0(initial output) = 5
Case 3 B1(initial public debt) = 1 Y0(initial output) = 10
Table 1: The setting on initial level of public debt and output in the three cases.
We examine the social welfare for the six cases, i.e., three cases [Case1, case2, case3] ×
two cases [GR(the golden rule), BBR(the balanced budget rule)]. We compute the social
welfare, SWt, in each period for t ≥ 1 until the economy converges to the balanced growth
path.
23For each case, we derive a ratio of social welfare of the golden rule to that of the balanced
budget rule, which is standardized as follows:
SWratiot :=
SW GR






t is deﬁned as social welfare at time t under the i ﬁscal rule (i = GR,BBR).
[Figures 5 , 6 , and 7 around here]
Figures 5, 6, and 7 provide the results. We note that relative to the golden rule (the
balanced budget rule), the balanced budget rule (the golden rule) provides the higher (lower)
social welfare for the far-future generations. This consequence is intuitive. Since the public-
debt/GDP ratio, ˜ Bt, converges to zero under the balanced budget rule, the private investment
is not crowed out by public debt in the long run. Meanwhile, under the golden rule, the
public-debt/GDP ratio converges to a certain positive level. This implies that the private
investment is retarded by public debt even in the long run. Therefore, the growth rate in
the golden rule is less than in the balanced budget rule in the far future. Nevertheless, as
seen in Figure 5, it takes very long time for the balanced budget rule to overtake the golden
rule when the economy starts with very low per capita output.
The balanced budget rule provides the higher social welfare for the super-near future
generations than the golden rule, whereas it provides the lower social welfare for the near
future generations.
We can understand this alternation of the dominant ﬁscal rules by looking at Eq.(20).
As seen in the later, the social welfare under both rules is mostly aﬀected by per capita
consumption and the eﬀect of the Gini coeﬃcient is limited. Under the balanced budget
rule, even more government bonds are issued in the super-near future than under the golden
rule, implying that the balanced budget rule imposes the lower rate of tax than the golden
rule. The crowding-out eﬀect of public debt on per capita output is limited in the super-short
run. Therefore, the balanced budget rule dominates the golden rule in the super-short run.
24Meanwhile, in the near future, more government bonds are issued under the golden rule
than the balanced budget rule and the golden rule imposes the lower rate of tax than the
balanced budget rule in the short run. The crowding-out eﬀect of public debt on per capita
output is still limited in the short run. Therefore, the golden rule dominates the balanced
budget rule. However, since in the long run, the crowding-out eﬀects of public debt on per
capita output accumulate, the level of per capita output in the balanced budget rule becomes
far more than that in the golden rule. Thus, the balanced budget rule becomes a dominant
ﬁscal rule once again.
We compare the eﬀects of 1 − Gt and ¯ ct on social welfare. Since the social welfare
function consists of these two components, it is important to investigate which factor more
signiﬁcantly aﬀects social welfare. We deﬁne Gratiot as a ratio of 1 − Gt of the two ﬁscal
rules, which is standardized as:
Gratiot =
(1 − GGR





Likewise, ¯ cratiot is a ratio of per capita consumption under the two rules:
¯ cratiot =
¯ cGR





By the numerical calculation, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of per capita consumption on social
welfare is much greater than the eﬀect of inequality in all cases. As seen in Figures 8-13,
the scale of the consumption ratio is about ten times as large as that of (1 − Gt). It is not
surprising that the Gini coeﬃcient has a small eﬀect on social welfare in the long-run because
an economy endogenously grows. In the short run, however, the eﬀect of the Gini coeﬃcient
on social welfare is very small relative to the eﬀect of per capita consumption as well. In
the super-near future generations, the balanced budget rule leads to more equity than the
golden rule. However, in the near and far future generations, the golden rule provides more
equity than the balanced budget rule.
[Figures 8-13 around here.]
256 Concluding Remarks
Does the dissipation of credit market imperfections promote or foil the sustainability of
public debt? In order to answer this question, we have developed an overlapping generations
model with public debt. Our ﬁndings are as follows. Whether the sustainability of public
debt is promoted or not when credit market imperfections are relaxed depends upon the
ﬁscal policy rules. Under the golden rule, as credit constraints become less severe (more
severe), public debt is more likely sustainable (unsustainable). On the contrary, under the
balanced budget rule, as credit constraints become more severe (less severe), it is more likely
sustainable (unsustainable).
We have also found that a ﬁscal policy has signiﬁcant eﬀects on social welfare via eco-
nomic growth, resource allocation, and income distribution. For the social welfare, we have
compared the outcomes of the golden rule and the balanced budget rule. The dominant ﬁscal
policies alternates depending upon generations. The balanced budget rule is more beneﬁcial
than the golden rule for the super-near future generations and the golden rule is more ben-
eﬁcial than the balanced budget rule for the near future generations. However, for the far
future generations, the balanced budget rule becomes more beneﬁcial than the golden rule
once again.
Appendix
Microfoundation for credit constraints
In this appendix, we provide two kinds of microfoundations for credit constraints. One is
based on the idea of Aghion and Banerjee (2005) and the other is based on that of Antras
and Caballero(2009).
26Microfoundation I
Following Aghion and Banerjee (2005), we provide a microfoundation for a credit constraint
facing each individual.15 The credit market imperfections simply come from the possibility
that borrowers may not repay the ﬁnancial intermediary their obligation.
Each agent prepares his own wealth wt to invest, which is wages earned when he is young.
If he is a borrower, his total resources are kt = wt − dt. From Eq.(2), the return on one
unit of investments is qt+1ϕ. If a borrower earnestly repays the ﬁnancial intermediary his
obligation, then he gets a net income, qt+1ϕkt + Rt+1dt. In turn, if he chooses not to repay
his obligations, then he incurs a cost, δkt to hide his revenues. When he does not repay his
obligations, the ﬁnancial intermediary monitors the borrower and it is able to capture the
borrower with probability pt+1. In this case, the expected income of the borrower is given
by qt+1ϕkt − δkt + pt+1Rt+1dt
Under this loan contract, the incentive compatibility constraint so as for a borrower not
to default is given by:
qt+1ϕkt + Rt+1dt ≥ [qt+1ϕ − δ]kt + pt+1Rt+1dt, (29)





The left-hand side of Eq.(29) is the revenues when the borrower invests in a project and
repay the ﬁnancial intermediary, whereas the right-hand side of Eq.(29) is the gain when the
borrower defaults. Eq.(30) is independent of the return on one unit of investments qt+1ϕ.
In order to attain the probability pt+1 to detect the borrower’s stalling, the ﬁnancial
intermediary incurs an eﬀort cost, dtC(pt+1), which is increasing and convex with respect
to pt+1. As in Aghion and Banerjee (2005), we assume C(pt+1) = κlog(1 − pt+1), where
κ is strictly greater than δ so that all borrowers face severer credit constraints than their
15Aghion, et al. (1999) and Aghion, et al. (2005) provide a microfoundation for a credit constraint in the
same line as Aghion and Banerjee (2005).
27natural debt limits. The ﬁnancial intermediary can choose an optimal probability to solve a
maximization problem such that:
max
pt+1
− pt+1Rt+1dt − κlog(1 − pt+1)dt.
Since −dt > 0, this maximization problem is rewritten as:
max
pt+1
pt+1Rt+1 + κlog(1 − pt+1).





As the interest rate Rt+1 increases, the ﬁnancial intermediary chooses the high probability
to detect the borrower’s hiding his revenues. This is because if Rt+1 goes up, borrowers have
higher incentives to default and thus the ﬁnancial intermediary makes more eﬀorts to detect










Since the individual’s productivity ϕ is not observable, the ﬁnancial intermediary does not
impose individual-speciﬁc credit constraints. However, it has to know how much wealth,
wt, individuals have. As long as it imposes a credit constraint given by inequality (32) on




which is a credit constraint in the main text.
28Microfoundation II
We extend a microfoundation for a credit constraint developed by Antras and Caballero
(2009) to the one suitable for our model. In particular, we consider a participation constraint
of the ﬁnancial intermediary and an incentive compatibility condition of borrowers so as for
them not to default.
We impose an assumption on the behavior of borrowers. It is assumed that at the end
of the ﬁrst period of their lifetime and after investment has occurred, any borrower can
escape with no cost from engaging his investment project, taking some of fractions of his
investment, (1 − µ)(wt − dt), where 0 < µ < 1 and not repaying the ﬁnancial intermediary
his obligations. In this case, he will be engaged in capital production somewhere and sell
capital goods in a market.
If a borrower walks away at the end of the ﬁrst period, then the ﬁnancial intermediary
can take back the amount of the remainder of investment, µ(wt − dt). We assume that the
ﬁnancial intermediary can lend the remainder of investment in the ﬁnancial market again.
Therefore, when the ﬁnancial intermediary makes a ﬁnancial contract with a borrower, it
faces a participation constraint such that:






On the other hand, the incentive compatibility constraint for a borrower not to escape
from engaging his project at the end of the ﬁrst period is given by:
ϕqt+1(wt − dt) + Rt+1dt ≥ ϕqt+1(1 − µ)(wt − dt). (34)
For individuals with ϕ such that Rt+1 − µϕqt+1 ≤ 0, Eq.(34) always holds. Therefore, we









1−µ, implying that Eq.(35)
is redundant.
To be summarized, if the ﬁnancial intermediary imposes a credit constraint dt ≥ −
µ
1−µwt,
which is the participation constraint of the ﬁnancial intermediary, borrowers never default.
By letting
µ
1−µ := η, we have a credit constraint dt ≥ −ηwt in the main text.
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Figure 4: A Diﬀerent Growth Pattern.



















Figure 5: The social welfare ratio under the case 1 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 3). [Horizontial axis:
the number of generations, Vertical axis: the social welfare ratio.]




















Figure 6: The social welfare ratio under the case 2 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 5). [Horizontial axis:
the number of generations, Vertical axis: the social welfare ratio.]



















Figure 7: The social welfare ratio under the case 3 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 10). [Horizontial axis:
the number of generations, Vertical axis: the social welfare ratio.]






















Figure 8: Gratio under the case 1 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 3). [Horizontial axis: the number of
generations, Vertical axis: Gratio.]





















Figure 9: ¯ cratio under the case 1 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 3). [Horizontial axis: the number of
generations, Vertical axis: ¯ cratio.]





















Figure 10: Gratio under the case 2 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 5). [Horizontial axis: the number of
generations, Vertical axis: Gratio.]





















Figure 11: ¯ cratio under the case 2 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 5). [Horizontial axis: the number of
generations, Vertical axis: ¯ cratio.]




















Figure 12: Gratio under the case 3 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 10). [Horizontial axis: the number of
generations, Vertical axis: Gratio.]




















Figure 13: ¯ cratio under the case 3 (B1 = 1 and Y0 = 10). [Horizontial axis: the number of
generations, Vertical axis: ¯ cratio.]
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